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Abstract. Information Security Management and Knowledge Manage-
ment show a couple of intriguing similarities. This paper identifies some
of these similarities and highlights abstract problems arising from them
in both areas. Those analogies motivate to look for possibilities to trans-
fer solutions from one area to the other.
1 Introduction
In our current world of postindustrial value generation, knowledge has become
one of the most significant production resources. The existence and success of a
growing number of organizations strongly depends on their capability of exclu-
sively using their knowledge for profit generation.
Such exclusively usable knowledge can appear in various forms. Intermediary
and final results from research and development departments possess the highest
value for an organization as long as they are unknown by rivals. Knowledge about
customers is one of the most valuable assets of many businesses and represents
a larger benefit if its use is restricted to the business itself. Consulting firms act
as aggregators of knowledge and are able to offer this knowledge at the market
as long as it can be used by them exclusively.3 Even the business models of
many open source firms are primarily built upon this principle. Their extensive
knowledge about a certain product predestines them as preferred provider of
respective complementary products like consulting services, training etc.4
As efficient utilization of exclusively usable industrial facilities and human
working power was the delimiting factor for the wealth and and growth of an
3 See, for example, Birkenkrahe (2002, p. 5): “In consulting, there is nothing but know-
ledge to sell.”
4 See, for example, Hars and Ou (2001, p. 3): “[C]ompanies like RedHat have begun to
offer commercial consulting, training, distribution, support, and implementation ser-
vices.” See also Grand, von Krogh, Leonard, and Swap (2004, p. 599): “These firms
do not realize returns from selling proprietary software protected by commercial li-
censes but by distributing and adding services to software protected under the OS
license.”
2organization in the former days of industrial production, efficient utilization of
exclusively usable knowledge has, in many cases, become the delimiting factor
nowadays. To ensure success, organizations therefor try to maximize the level of
exclusively usable knowledge inside the organization.
Currently, this aim is addressed by two main fields of activity: Knowledge
Management and Information Security Management.
Knowledge Management has been defined as “[...] the capability by which
communities capture the knowledge that is critical to their success, constantly
improve it, and make it available in the most effective manner to those who
need it [...]” (Birkenkrahe, 2002, p. 5). According to Liebowitz (1999, p. iii f.),
Knowledge Management is dealing “with the process of creating value from an
organization’s intangible assets” and is about “the conceptualization, review,
consolidation and action phases of creating, securing, combining, coordination
and retrieving knowledge”.
Information Security, on the other hand, is usually outlined as the “preser-
vation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information” while “other
properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability
can also be involved” (ISO/ IEC, 2005, p. 2). There are a number of alternative
definitions, but in any case, confidentiality, integrity and availability of informa-
tion play an outstanding role and can thus be identified as the core of Information
Security. Information Security Management can thus be defined as the manage-
ment of activities being aimed at the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
organization-internal information.
This article identifies several similarities between the fields of Knowledge
Management and Information Security Management inside organizations and
ascribes well-known challenges from daily practice to some common abstract
problems. It then introduces a couple of well known strategies and activities from
both areas which overcome some of the known problems at least within one of
the two fields. In a final step, established solutions from one field are transferred
to the other field to suggest possible new approaches for supporting Knowledge
Management and Information Security Management inside organizations.
2 Similarities
Both fields, Knowledge Management and Information Security Management,
are rated highly important by organizations and have been strongly present
to IT-departments and top management over the past few years. These two
fields share—from an abstract point of view—some common characteristics that
suggest translating established solutions from one area to the other:
2.1 Dependence on People
First, in both disciplines success heavily depends on people. In Knowledge Ma-
nagement, people have to share their individual—tacit as well as explicit—
knowledge with others to form and establish a comprehensive body of knowledge
3which can be used (and thus profited from) all over the organization. This body
of knowledge has in turn to be capitalized by other members of the organization.
The same is true for Information Security. After decades of mainly techni-
cal approaches to Information Security, it is now widely accepted that “people
are the cornerstone of [information] security” (Bishop and Frincke, 2005, p. 49).
To make Information Security work, people have to behave in a secure man-
ner, must not circumvent established security mechanisms and procedures, and
should develop a sense for making the right decision in case of unforeseen events.
Thus, a strong dependence on people’s behavior can be identified as a first
similarity between Knowledge Management and Information Security Manage-
ment.
2.2 Production of Public Goods
The second similarity is that both areas are aimed at the production of what
economists call public goods. In economic theory, public goods are defined as
being non-rival in consumption, which means that any usage of the good does
not decrease its value or availability for others, and non-excludable, meaning
that nobody can be barred from making use of the good.5 At least for the scope
of the organization, these characteristics apply to Knowledge Management as
well as to Information Security Management.6
As mentioned above, Knowledge Management is conducted to create and sus-
tain a body of knowledge that can be used all over the organization to generate
profit. Making use of this existing knowledge results in a higher working effi-
ciency. It would therefore be counterproductive for an organization to exclude
any of its members from using an existing body of knowledge for daily work,
resulting in non-exclusive treatment of knowledge.7
The principle of non-rivalry, in turn, results from the non-physical nature of
knowledge. As an information good, knowledge can—once it has been produced—
be used repeatedly at minimal or even at zero costs8 leading to non-scarcity. If
one member uses existing knowledge, this does in no way limit or constrain its
utility for other members.
The same is true for Information Security. Once a solution for enhancing
Information Security has been established, the usual case is that there is no
5 See, for example, Mankiw and Taylor (2006, p. 208).
6 This limitation to the scope of the organization could encourage using the term
of club goods instead of public goods because of the exclusion of non-members of
the organization. Nonetheless, as this article solely takes an internal view of the
organization and ignores external circumstances, we will keep using the term of
public goods.
7 A possible exclusion of individual members from certain kinds of information, for
example to prevent information overload, does not affect this basic principle. It is
therefore not further considered herein.
8 See, for example, Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 21): “Information is costly to produce
but cheap to reproduce.”
4rivalry in making use of it.9 Information Security does not decrease for any
individual member of an organization as a result of another member making use
it.10
Non-exclusion is also present for organizational Information Security. With
Information Security being a fundamental (and non-rival) requirement for smooth
operations, it would make no sense for an organization to exclude any member
from taking advantage of it. In fact, the opposite is true: If an organization would
intentionally hinder any of its members from having a certain level of Informa-
tion Security, this would impose possible weaknesses since most Information
Security problems are weakest-link problems11. Consequently, non-exclusion of
single members is the usual case for organizational Information Security.
In sum, Knowledge Management and Information Security Management share
a second similarity, being aimed at the production of organization-internal public
goods.
2.3 Positive Effect on Exclusively Usable Knowledge
A positive effect on the exclusively usable knowledge of an organization is a third
similarity of Knowledge Management and Information Security Management.
Knowledge Management is aimed at enhancing visibility and accessibility of
an organization’s existing knowledge for every member. Individual knowledge
has to be divulged organization-wide to increase the amount of organization-
internal knowledge that can be used by any individual (to generate profit for
the organization as a whole). For organizations, this profit-increasing effect is
most significant for internal knowledge not being available to rivals and thus
representing a competitive advantage.
In short, knowledge that can be used by all members of an organization
promises higher profits than individual knowledge and knowledge that remains
secret from competitors promises higher profits than knowledge that is pub-
licly available. Knowledge Management is thus aimed at expanding the body of
exclusively usable knowledge.
As mentioned above, confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
are the classical main goals of Information Security. By applying these goals
to the body of exclusively usable knowledge, it becomes clear that Information
Security Management is not directly aimed at increasing this body, but rather
at preventing its decrease. Confidentiality decreases the risk of business secrets
9 The underlying scale effects of Information Security have, for example, been men-
tioned by Biri and Trenta (2004, p. 15). See also CSI /FBI (2005, p. 7): “[T]here are
strictly increasing economies of scale when it comes to information security”.
10 In fact, there might be cases where this only holds true up to a certain level of
available capacity. As a vivid example, one could think of a content-scanner being
built into a corporate firewall, which might be unable to scan huge amounts of traffic.
The same would be true for security trainings and several other measures. But, as a
matter of principle, Information Security is still non-rival in most cases.
11 See, for example, Schneier (2004, p.xxii).
5getting known by rivals and thus assures exclusiveness, integrity prevents know-
ledge from being manipulated and availability is targeted against cases of existing
knowledge not being usable for the organization’s members. Thus, Information
Security Management is, similar to Knowledge Management, aimed at having a
positive effect on the body of exclusively usable knowledge.
2.4 Optimization Challenge
As a final major similarity, Knowledge Management and Information Secu-
rity Management both represent optimization challenges. As Bjo¨rck (2001, p. 1)
stated, “[t]oo much business security [...] increase[s] [...] costs and reduce[s] [...]
potential revenue streams substantially”. Even if many Information Security in-
vestments might have a positive payoff, there will always be a point from where
on additional security investments will result in a negative payoff due to two
main reasons:
First, with every investment in Information Security the remaining risks de-
crease (at least, they should . . . ) and become more costly to decrease further. At
some state, a point is reached where the expected loss resulting from a risk not
being eliminated is lower than the costs of eliminating it. And second, if there is
“too much security” in place, working gets less efficient due to a growing number
of restrictions and constraints, leading to substantial losses of profits that would
otherwise have been possible. Thus, the optimization challenge for Information
Security Management is to find the level of security where the marginal benefit
of an additional countermeasure equals its marginal costs.
For Knowledge Management, the optimization challenge is similar. Up to
a certain point, the refurbishment of existing knowledge and creation of new
knowledge results in an overall benefit for the organization, exceeding the costs
that have to be borne due to a loss of “productive” working time. As it is the
case for Information Security, there will always be a point where the marginal
benefit of additional knowledge management efforts is lower than the resulting
marginal cost. In both fields, the optimization challenge is finding the point from
where on additional efforts would be counterproductive.
2.5 Summary
So far, we have identified four major similarities between the areas of corporate
Information Security Management and Knowledge Management: The strong in-
volvement of and dependence on people, the aim of producing an organization-
internal public good, a positive effect on the exclusively usable knowledge of the
organization and the underlying optimization problem of finding the optimal
level from where on additional costs and inefficiencies outreach additional bene-
fits. Further similarities could be identified. However, we will focus on the men-
tioned four. Resulting from these abstract similarities, there are some mutual
abstract problems being known from daily practice of Knowledge Management
and Information Security Management.
63 Abstract Problems
Based on the four similarities of Information Security Management and Know-
ledge Management we just identified, we can draw two common goals.
1. Producing and protecting an organization-internal public good mostly rely-
ing on people.
2. Finding the optimal level from where on additional costs and inefficiencies
outreach additional benefits.
Those two goals entail a couple of abstract problems that are similar for
Information Security Management and Knowledge Management.
3.1 Production of Public Goods and Misaligned Incentives
Since Information Security and Knowledge are both considered public goods,
they can be described using the economic model of externalities. If an individual
user behaves in a secure manner or generates publicly available knowledge, he
creates a benefit for the organization as a whole while solely bearing the costs—a
positive externality. The creation of those public goods by individuals is being
impeded by three central problems which we will analyze in the following.
Misaligned and Negative Incentives: As we have described in our analysis
of similarities between Information Security Management and Knowledge Ma-
nagement, both activities highly depend on people. Companies face the problem
that the company’s motivation for the creation of public goods, like Informa-
tion Security and publicly available knowledge, is not valid for individuals who
have to bear the costs of production. Those individuals have no or even negative
incentives to support their companies’ ambitions.
There is no obvious direct “Return on Investment” for an individual if he
behaves in a secure manner.12 To the contrary, the deployment of security solu-
tions and processes builds working barriers and costs in intangibles like “time,
convenience, flexibility, or privacy” (Schneier, 2006, p. 8), that have to be borne
by the individual. Those trade-offs can therefore be regarded as negative incen-
tives. Another barrier is the bad image that is being attached to security. If the
company does not manage to implement a corporate security culture, people are
often said to be paranoid if they have strong passwords and not-trusting if they
don’t want to share them with their colleagues.13
12 Furthermore, employees are normally not being held fully accountable for their ac-
tions. See Anderson and Moore (2006, p. 610): “Network insecurity is somewhat like
air pollution or traffic congestion, in that people who connect insecure machines to
the Internet do not bear the full consequences of their actions.”
13 See, for example, Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich (2001, p. 127): “People who exhibit
good password behaviour are often described as ’paranoid’, ’pedantic’ or ’the kind of
person who doesn’t trust anybody’”.
7Very similar problems arise in knowledge management. The devotion of time
to generate knowledge, especially in companies with strict deadlines and a lot
of pressure, is unlikely to happen as long as the company does not create other
incentives for doing so. Employees who use knowledge management systems in-
tensively are regarded as having too much spare time or wanting to make a good
impression in front of their superiors.
Since knowledge is being regarded as power14 people are motivated to acquire
knowledge generated by others but it is unlikely that they share their knowledge
altruistically on pure basis of their intrinsic motivation. The result are free riders
who use public resources (knowledge or security) generated by others but do not
participate in the creation themselves.
Short-term Orientation: Not only the individual who has to create the public
good, but also his direct superior and sometimes even the CEO of a company
have individual incentives that are misaligned with the company’s needs.
Since many managers are evaluated on basis of their quarterly or yearly
results—from the perspective of a company very short-termed—they often act
in an inconsiderate manner. This is being worsened because measures have to be
in place for some time to see a benefit resulting from the ongoing efforts.15 Sus-
tainable, long-term oriented corporate governance is therefore hard to achieve,
especially if a company is partially owned by external investors looking for short-
term profits.
This lack of incentives for long-term orientation in corporate governance
hinders managers to develop and implement Information Security or Knowledge
Management concepts. Even if there are concepts and measures already in place,
if the management is not convinced that the organization will benefit from them
and if it does not have any other personal incentives to support those measures,
it will not behave as a good example. Hence, their subordinates will not act
according to corporate policies and principles because they follow the behavior
of the management.
Short-term orientation and misaligned incentives for management and other
employees leads to another problem. A critical mass of users must adopt the
system before others are being sensitized and see a benefit from using it.16 The
building up of this critical mass is countervailed by an effect which was described
by Anderson and Moore (2006, p. 611) as the bootstrapping problem—the focus
of our next paragraph.
14 “[K]nowledge itself is a power” (Bacon, 1996, p.71)
15 But even then, security is extremely hard to measure. See, for example, Schneier
(2006, p. 5 f.): “Most of the time, we hear about security only when it fails. [...]
we might conclude that the security expenditures are wasteful, because the successes
remain invisible.”
16 Even if this critical mass has been reached, the costs borne by the individual for
producing the public good are still higher than the resulting benefits—unless there
are other advantages for him.
8Critical Mass and Bootstrapping: If there is only one user who got a secure
password and sticks to security procedures, the organization is still insecure
because an intruder can just pick another employee’s account to enter the system.
As more and more employees’ behavior complies with the company’s security
policy, the risk is being reduced because the attacker has fewer potential accounts
he can crack and a security culture might start to be established within the
company. Other employees will be influenced by the majority of people complying
with defined procedures and newcomers are likely to adopt the new corporate
culture.17
Anderson and Moore (2006, p. 611) describe the underlying problem, which
can be called a bootstrapping problem, as follows:
“if everyone waits for others to go first, the technology [or process,
corporate culture, ...] never gets deployed.”
The same principle applies to Knowledge Management. Sharing tacit know-
ledge makes sense right from the start, even if only two employees decide to do
so. For explicit knowledge, often stored in knowledge management systems, the
value of the system increases with the number of users actively using it. Manag-
ing tacit knowledge by making it explicit, for example by letting employees fill
out profiles with their special abilities and interest, does not make sense and will
not be used by others unless there is a critical amount of information already in
the system.
3.2 The Optimization Problem
The last problem we would like to discuss is the challenge of finding the optimal
Information Security or Knowledge Management investment.
In Information Security Management, the annual loss expectancy must be
balanced with security investments, which consist of spending on information
security measures and indirect costs18. Most of those resulting costs, caused
indirectly by implementing new security measures, are due to a decline of work
efficiency. New security measures often imply additional barriers for users.19
Calculating those overall security investments (direct costs and resulting costs)
is therefore a complex task. Another complex problem is to determine the annual
loss expectancy. As a part of risk management, it requires an assessment of all
17 Some people will argue that one employee who does not behave in a secure manner is
enough for the attacker to get into the corporate system (weakest link principle). It is
true that in Knowledge Management free riders, who do not participate in building
up the public good but “consume” it (of course without decreasing it), can more
easily be accepted than in Information Security Management. But, as soon as more
and more people stick to policies, the security awareness of all other employees is
automatically being increased as well—which is one of the main goals of Information
Security Management
18 See: Schneier (2004, p. 301 f.)
19 E.g. lower usability, connectivity and flexibility.
9corporate assets, their categorization and valuation.20 Most companies already
fail in identifying their assets. The annual loss expectancy is being calculated
based on the value of a company’s assets and the risk of disclosure, manipulation
and loss or temporary unavailability. Determining the expected loss is highly
complex because all secondary losses resulting from an initial security breach
must be included as well. Examples are the loss of goodwill (e.g. corporate
image and trust of suppliers, partners and customers) and loss of working and
production time due to unavailable information or resources. Calculating the
Return on Security Investment (ROSI) is the term used by security professionals
for describing this task.
Determining the Return on Investment (ROI) is also the primary problem be-
hind optimizing Knowledge Management activities. Up to a certain point, invest-
ing resources (time and money21) in knowledge management activities generates
a benefit for the organization as a whole. Explicit knowledge can be searched
more efficiently if it is stored in a structured way, accessible through a user-
friendly interface. Tacit knowledge can be utilized if communication within the
company is enhanced by measures like the implementation of an expert direc-
tory, organizational measures and the establishment of a corporate culture that
supports knowledge exchange. Spending further resources after passing the op-
timal investment leads to a situation where additional costs outweigh additional
benefits. Individuals might still experience beneficial situation for themselves but
those benefits are generated at the expense of the organization as a whole. An
example is the knowledge acquisition of a particular employee, through training
and study during working time, in fields unrelated to his actual work.
Calculating Return on Security Investment (Information Security spending)
and Return on Investment for Knowledge Management activities are major prob-
lems that have neither been solved satisfactorily by research nor business.22
3.3 Summary
The creation and protection of the public goods Information Security and Know-
ledge is hindered by an initial bootstrapping problem and by misaligned and
negative incentives. No single employee wants to start investing in those activi-
ties if he does not see any benefits for himself, as long as nobody else supports
those activities as well. Even if a critical mass of users is being reached, people
have negative incentives, like loss of time, convenience, flexibility and privacy,
to generate those public goods.
20 The implicitness of this widely accepted approach can be questioned. If the calcu-
lation of an annual loss expectancy is too complex to achieve, one could look for
other approaches. Due to the complexity of Return on Investment estimation, self-
optimization without any direct human interaction would be ideal.
21 Well, time is money ;-)
22 Deficiencies in calculating a Return on Investment further leads to very practical
problems for managers in charge of Information Security or Knowledge Management.
Receiving budgets for implementing new measures, especially organizational ones, is
extremely hard because they cannot provide a list of direct monetary benefits.
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From a company’s perspective, another problem is finding the optimal in-
vestment in Information Security and Knowledge Management. Calculating a
Return on Investment for those activities is extremely complex and results are
very hard to measure.
Today, in a world that has undergone a substantial shift from industrial to
knowledge-based societies, both activities are absolutely essential. Business and
research proposed solutions for solving the problems we just described. In the
following, we will present a couple of those solutions that and discuss the question
if Knowledge Management can adopt measures present in Information Security
Management, as well as vice versa.
4 Solutions through Analogies
As it has been shown so far, Knowledge Management and Information Security
Management share some common abstract properties and are facing the same
two abstract problems resulting from these. Any substantial improvement in
either of those areas has to take into account the identified abstract problems
and must provide partial solutions to at least one of them.
Thus, one possible method for the identification of new approaches for en-
hancing Knowledge Management and Information Security Management inside
organizations would be to find abstract solutions for the abstract problems and
then derive applicable solutions from them.
An alternative way, which is pursued herein, is identifying existing solutions
that are established and are considered as being effective and efficient for one of
the two areas and then transferring these solutions to the other area. A solution
being established in the area of Knowledge Management to meet the problem
of underproduction of the “public good” might, for example, provide promising
approaches for tackling the same abstract problem in the area of Information
Security Management.
4.1 General Similarities in Solutions
Before transferring solutions from one field to the other, we would like to high-
light some general similarities that currently established strategies to improving
Information Security and Knowledge Management inherit.
1. Multi-layered Solutions:
Concepts were not always multi-layered. In Information Security, for exam-
ple, early strategies tried to solve problems through technical measures alone.
But today, Information Security Management and Knowledge Management
both focus on three different layers within the organization: technology, or-
ganization and people.
2. From Management by Incidents to Management by Objectives:
In both fields, measures were for a long time only implemented when in-
cidents occurred. Without a security breach or knowledge management in-
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cidents23, budget was not allocated to Information Security or Knowledge
Management. Additionally, even if there was budget available, the measures
that were implemented focused on solving problems that recently occurred.
Only recently, management realized that they should favor proactive ma-
nagement, management by objectives (MBO), over reactive management,
management by incidents.24
3. PDCA or Deming Cycle:
Since both fields require a continuous process of adaption to changing re-
quirements, their management can be described as a Deming Cycle, con-
sisting of plan, do, check and act. For Information Security Management,
the cycle is composed of: Establish ISMS 25 (plan), Implement and operate
the ISMS (do), Monitor and review the ISMS (check) and Maintain and im-
prove the ISMS (act).26 The corresponding steps in Knowledge Management
are: Analysis and conceptualization (plan), Implementation of measures and
change management (do), Review and success measurement (check) and Im-
prove concept by adapting to new requirements and results from review (act).
4.2 Transferring Solutions from Information Security Management
to Knowledge Management
We begin with the direction of transferring established solutions for Information
Security Management to the field of Knowledge Management. In doing so, we
refer to the standard ISO/IEC27001:2005 to identify widely accepted solutions.
In the standard’s annex (pp. 13–29), there are a couple of control objectives and
controls of which we chose a small subset for exemplary transfer to the field of
Knowledge Management. For every chosen control, we give a brief description
and link it to the above-mentioned abstract problems the control is being aimed
at. Finally, we derive ideas for transferring the control to the area of Knowledge
Management.
A.5.1 Security Policy: The first group of controls being mentioned in the
standard refers to information security policies. Such a policy should be in place,
widely communicated throughout the organization, be approved by the manage-
ment and regularly updated. These controls are mainly aimed at the abstract
problem of misaligned or negative incentives. Especially by prescribing a certain
kind of behavior and introducing sanctions for non-compliance, policies intro-
duce negative incentives for selfish behavior and thereby readjust individual
incentives. The same type of solution could be applied to Knowledge Manage-
ment by introducing a knowledge sharing policy that forces the members of the
23 Companies often buy out entire management levels from their competitor, which
results in a profound loss of knowledge. Another problem is a natural, but extraor-
dinary high fluctuation of employees.
24 Probst, Raub, and Romhardt (2006, p. 55), ISO/ IEC (2005)
25 ISMS: Information Security Management System
26 ISO/ IEC (2005, p. vi)
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organization to share their knowledge with others and enables sanctions in case
of non-sharing.
A.7.2 Information Classification: Another group of Information Security
controls addresses the classification of different types of information in matters
of its value, sensitivity or criticality for the organization. Information shall be
labeled in terms of this qualitative classification and shall be handled accord-
ingly. This group of controls is primarily aimed at the optimization problem, as it
encourages non-uniform treatment of information and thereby allows to restrict
measures with high indirect costs to highly sensitive information while keeping
indirect costs lower for less critical information. Transfer of this principle to
Knowledge Management could, for example, be realized through a similar clas-
sification of different kinds of knowledge according to its ascribed importance
for the organization. By doing so, an organization could diversify Knowledge
Management investments and accept higher indirect costs for pivotal knowledge
while limiting them for rather nonsignificant domains.
A.8.2 Human Resources Security During Employment: The human di-
mension is also represented by an own group of controls in ISO27001. Manage-
ment has to make sure that employees as well as third parties follow established
policies and procedures and a formal process for sanctions shall be in place.
These controls are aimed at the enforcement of an established policy and are
therefrom targeted at the abstract problem of misaligned incentives. They could
similarly be applied to the enforcement of a knowledge sharing policy.
Additionally, this group of controls refers to security awareness, education
and training. Usual realizations of this measure go far beyond the suggested
training sessions and include awareness posters or regular columns and articles
in company magazines, just to name a few examples. Such awareness and train-
ing initiatives are primarily aimed at the abstract problems of short-term orien-
tation and the bootstrapping problem. They shall lead to well-informed and less
short-sighted users and provide an opportunity for reaching a critical mass by es-
tablishing a security culture. The same approaches can be pursued for Knowledge
Management. Training on different aspects of Knowledge Management can be
conducted and even the idea of awareness campaigns is transferable. Think, for
example, of knowledge sharing initiatives including posters reminding employees
to share their knowledge with others, regular columns in corporate magazines
introducing selected articles from a Knowledge Management System etc.
Similar considerations could be made for many other Information Security
measures. However, our goal was to give a few examples, hoping to have illus-
trated how established approaches from Information Security Management can
be transferred to Knowledge Management to generate new ideas for creative
solutions.
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We will now follow the same approach in the opposite direction, applying
established approaches from Knowledge Management to Information Security
Management.
4.3 Transferring Solutions from Knowledge Management to
Information Security Management
For the transfer from Knowledge Management to Information Security Manage-
ment, we chose to follow the structure proposed by the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN). During a workshop in 2004, they developed, together
with participating member states, a framework they called European Guide to
good Practice in Knowledge Management27. We will just pick a few ideas from
the standard and try to translate them into Information Security measures.
Part 2 – 5.4 Motivation: For overcoming the problem of misaligned incen-
tives, the European best practice guide suggests a couple of methods and espe-
cially focusses on rewarding employees who engage in Knowledge Management
activities. It differentiates between social rewards and financial rewards.
Examples for social rewards in Knowledge Management are recognition by
colleagues, managers and subordinates, or improved power (bigger choice of ac-
tion, larger field of responsibilities, . . . ).
The current way of “motivating” employees to stick to information security
policies is by putting pressure on them if they don’t. Using positive, instead of
negative incentives might make sense in Information Security Management as
well. Giving positive feedback to employees who behave in a very secure manner
or suggest ideas how to reduce risks, can be extremely motivating for them. 28
Financial rewards are another way to create positive incentives, instead of
solely relying on pressure. In Knowledge Management, financial incentive sys-
tems are pretty common. One possible way is to reward staff on basis of the
number of articles created for or commented in a Knowledge Management sys-
tem if those articles were useful for others. Practice shows that this way many
employees start using a system without any pressure from management. There
are odds related to this method though. If such an incentive system is being
used for a long period of time, the extrinsic motivation of bonuses is likely to
reduce the employees’ intrinsic motivation. Therefore, it should only be used at
the beginning, to reach a critical mass of users and to overcome the bootstrapping
problem.29 A similar system might make sense in Information Security Manage-
ment. At the beginning, after a new policy has been released, employees who
stick to those policies or suggest improvements could get financially rewarded. If
27 See European Commitee for Standardization (2004)
28 However, one should keep in mind that the choice of measures and their success
highly depends on regional and corporate cultures and will therefore vary from com-
pany to company.
29 If the critical mass has been reached, secure behavior has become the norm. Behavior
outside of the norm should be punished. See Ellickson (1991, p. 125 f.)
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secure behavior becomes the norm, the company can shift to negative incentives
again, punishing those who do not stick to the policy.
Part 3 – 6.2.7 Pilot Implementation and Feedback of Results:
“In an ideal situation, instead of implementing the project immedi-
ately across the whole organization, a pilot implementation should be
carried out, during which it should be possible to learn from the process
and to avoid the pitfalls encountered when extending the implementation
process across the whole organization.”30
In Knowledge Management, this approach is being followed very often. Small
measures, taken out of a complex concept, are being implemented first. The ac-
ceptance and upcoming problems are analyzed and the concept is being adjusted,
either by replacing or modifying the measure, or by coming up with new incen-
tives that support the implementation of the concept. This pilot project can
also be implemented within a small group, maybe a department or a branch of
the organization. This reduces the costs of adjusting to problems that were not
anticipated at the beginning.
Information Security managers, on the other hand, develop a security concept
and normally try to roll-out their entire concept, including all measures, at
once. Without prior probing the acceptance and analyzing resulting costs in
intangibles, late changes are likely and costly. In software development, the roll-
out of Knowledge Management activities would be called agile programming or
extreme programming, Information Security projects rather follow the classical
waterfall approach. It seems to be beneficial to transfer agile implementation
methods from Knowledge Management to Information Security Management:
probing small parts of the concept within a small test group first, listening to
feedback and adjusting concepts accordingly.
For analyzing problems and preventing mistakes to be made twice, knowledge
managers use a method called lessons learned, which is being described in section
7.2.1 of the CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA). Even if an adoption of lessons
learned for Information Security aspects has already happened, it is normally
not being institutionalized.
Part 4 – Measuring: Part 4 of the workshop agreement (“Guidelines for
Measuring KM”) does not provide Knowledge Management practitioners with
an ultimate tool to measure the outcome of Knowledge Management activities.
It therefore cannot fully solve the problem of calculating a return on investment.
Nevertheless, it introduces a couple of tools that help managers to keep various
perspectives of their Knowledge Management activities in mind. By using a tool,
like a balanced score card, those perspectives can be described in performance
figures. Implementing one of the tools being used in Knowledge Management can
help Information Security managers to broaden their horizon and to continuously
evaluate all effects of their activities.
30 See European Commitee for Standardization (2004, part 3, p. 30)
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5 Conclusion and Outlook
As we have seen, Information Security Management and Knowledge Management
share some natural similarities. These similarities lead to to common problems
that can be tackled in similar ways. We have shown that it is possible to identify
new approaches for solving currently unsolved problems from one field by looking
at established solutions from the other one. As fields can be considered analogous
to a certain extent, solutions might be similar, too.
This analogy opens a wide field of opportunities for future action. Practition-
ers could expand the exemplary transfer of measures to further ones in order to
derive practical solutions. Researchers, on the other hand, might rather be inter-
ested in abstract solutions for the identified abstract problems. These may lead
to innovative approaches for the world of practice in a later step, too.
Interestingly, Information Security Management and Knowledge Manage-
ment are not the only areas of the same nature. To the contrary, the identified
similarities are not even restricted to microeconomics. Environmental protec-
tion, for instance, is a macroeconomic problem that also relies on individuals—
companies or even states in that case—who have to build or rather avoid the
corrosion of a public good. Established practices from environmental protection
could thus provide further inspiration for Knowledge Management and Informa-
tion Security Management.
Further research might also consider organizational forms differing from es-
tablished ones. The concept of a “body of exclusively usable knowledge” might,
for example, not hold true for organizations following an approach of “open
innovation” leading to more “porous” (Chesbrough, 2003, p. 37) boundaries be-
tween “internal” and “external” and thereby possibly eliminating the necessity
of exclusiveness considered herein. It would be interesting to analyze the result-
ing implications for Knowledge Management as well as for Information Security
Management.
Another starting point for future research might be the ongoing shift of orga-
nizational forms. Thomas W. Malone (2004), for example, identified an ongoing
shift from independent entities over hierarchical organizations to more networked
structures. Generally speaking, top-down governance will not work anymore in
such organizations and is likely to be replaced by more market-driven approaches.
It would be interesting to identify possibilities for realizing organizational Infor-
mation Security and Knowledge Sharing on the basis of market forces.
Such approaches might provide advanced solutions for the optimization prob-
lem, which is currently tackled by using economic calculus based upon extensive
data aggregation. As F.A.Hayek already stated—even though in a different
context and more than sixty years ago: “the ’data’ from which the economic
calculus starts are never [...] ’given’ to a single mind which could work out the
implications and can never be so given.”
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